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DPD-3343-59

18 MAY 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR : Acting Chief, DPD-DD/P
THROUGH : Chief, Administrative Branch, DPD-DD/P
SUBJECT : GUSTO - USAF Support
(AFCHS-5 vs ARDC)

1. After considering all factors concerning need for USAF support of the GUSTO program, it is my recommendation that an office in Headquarters USAF (AFCHS-5) be assigned this responsibility. This conclusion is based on the security consideration in the factors of function, command, personnel, security, logistics, contacts, procedures and past experience.

2. Points pertinent are:

- (a) Support of our operations requires a world wide organization.
- (b) In GUSTO we have requirements for logistical support, funding, personnel, construction, operations and intelligence matters without being able to explain or justify the need for same.
- (c) ARDC is a research and development unit without command function.
- (d) ARDC does not operate outside the United States.
- (e) To gain support we need full USAF endorsement. AFCHS-5 currently has this. On their present Headquarters level, they have direct access to all Deputy and Assistant Chiefs of Staff. ARDC will have to cultivate or develop this access. A point in favor of AFCHS-5 is the document in their possession signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense which designates AFCHS-5 as the support office for the GUSTO program.

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(f) AFCH-5 is in the position whereby they may communicate with and direct units of all levels world wide without explanation since they are in essence Headquarters USAF.

(g) From a personnel and security view to establish a support office in ANDC would require the clearing and briefing of numerous additional personnel and I believe, still require an ANDC support office in Headquarters USAF. It must be realized that with each additional individual becoming knowledgeable of our activities, our control is weakened.

3. While either ANDC or AFCH-5 can maintain tight security, considering the experience with the project of both ANDC and AFCH-5, we must take into account that AFCH-5 has been very effectively associated with our programs for four and one half ($4\frac{1}{2}$) years. During this period, AFCH-5 has established procedures and contacts which would take time for ANDC to establish.

4. Although the current control procedures established by AFCH-5 are in essence effective, it is recommended that some changes take place control-wise. It is suggested that AFCH-5 be held responsible for all Air Force participation in our programs on the following pertinent points:

- (a) Air Force T/O structure.
- (b) Clearance control and justification for clearances.
- (c) Briefings and debriefings
- (d) Coordination of other pertinent information.

Security Officer
BPD-DD/P

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